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ABSTRACT

Many recording artists and songwriters never reap the rewards of their work. America's first
professional songwriter died in poverty at the age of thirty-seven. At the Congressional level the
situation has described recording artists as "one group of creators who get ripped off more than
anybody else in any other industry". As we approach 2013, there will be a new line of cases that deal
with authors of sound recordings attempting to terminate their copyright assignment to the record
companies. While the most efficient and frugal solution would be legislative action, the most
probable outcome is expensive, fact-intensive litigation. Congress and the Supreme Court have
emphasized the value of predictability in copyright ownership. In this situation, Congress has fallen
short of that goal. Sound Recordings do not fit the definition of work made for hire under the 1976
Copyright Act. While analyzing the 2013 terminations, courts should not overlook the congressional
intent of creating an inalienable termination right for authors.
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You DON'T OWN ME: WHY WORK FOR HIRE SHOULD
NOT BE APPLIED TO SOUND RECORDINGS
WILLIAM HENSLEE & ELIZABETH HENSLEE*

I. INTRODUCTION
Society is filled with glorified visions of rock stars and the rock-star-lifestyle.
Generalized in the 2006 hit "Rockstar" by Nickelback, the lyrics state:
I'm through with standing in line to the clubs I'll never get it/It's like the
bottom of the ninth and I'm never gonna win/ This life hasn't turned out
quite the way I want it to be/I want a brand new house on an episode of
Cribs/And a bathroom I can play baseball in/And a king size tub big enough
for ten plus me/I'll need a credit card that's got no limit/And a big black jet
with a bedroom in it/ ... /I want a new tour bus full of old guitars/My own
star on Hollywood Boulevard/. . . /I'm gonna trade this life for fortune and
fame/I'd even cut my hair and change my name/'Cause we all just want to
be big rock stars/Livin' in hilltop houses driving fifteen cars.'
But what the songs and visions of the glamorous life do not tell the young
recording artists, is that the signing bonus is quickly spent, and the value of the rock
songs you hear on the radio is not really known when you sign your first recording
contract. 2
Many recording artists and songwriters never reap the rewards of their work.
America's first professional songwriter died in poverty at the age of thirty-seven. 3 At
the Congressional level the situation has described recording artists as "one group of

*C William Henslee & Elizabeth Henslee 2011. William Henslee is an Associate Professor of
Law and founding faculty member, Florida A&M University College of Law. B.A. University of
Hawaii, J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, M.F.A. University of California, Los Angeles
Graduate School of Theater, Film, & Television. Elizabeth Henslee received her J.D. from Florida
A&M University College of Law and her B.A. in Comparative Literature from Emory University.
1NICKELBACK, Rockstar, on ALL THE RIGHT REASONS (Roadrunner Records 2006).
2 See Emily Burrows, Note, Termination of Sound Recording Copyrights & the Potential
Unconscionability of Work for Hire Clauses, 30 REV. LITIG. 101, 101-02 (2010) ("The classic story of
a young artist entering into an unfair record deal and receiving pennies on the dollar for his work
after years of recording a touring resonates throughout the music community."); Online
Entertainment and Copyright Law: Coming Soon to a Digital Device Near You: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 15 (2001) (statement of Don Henley on behalf of the
Recording Artists Coalition) ("A new-artist agreement is one-sided in favor of the labels. A typical
artist could sell half a million records and not see one dollar in royalties."). See also, William
Henslee, What's Wrong With U.S.? Why the Failure of Congress to Pass a Performance Rights Bill
Hurts American Record Companies and Recording Artists, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 739 (2011).
3 Music Licensing Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Rick Carnes, President of the Songwriters
Guild of Am.) ("Stephen Foster, America's first professional songwriter, died in poverty with 38
cents in his pocket at the age of thirty-seven.").

[10:695 2011]

You Don't Own Me: Why Work for Hire Should Not
Be Applied to Sound Recordings

697

creators who get ripped off more than anybody else in any other industry." 4 As we
approach 2013, there will be a new line of cases that deal with authors of sound
recordings attempting to terminate their copyright assignment to the record
companies.
One of the basic tenets of our copyright scheme is that an "author" or owner of a
work has many exclusive rights. 5 These include the right: (1) to reproduce the
copyrighted work; (2) to prepare derivative works; (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords to the public; (4) to perform the copyrighted work publically; (5) to
display the works publically; and (6) "in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission." 6 These
exclusive rights can be transferred by an author. 7 Usually, a transfer is made for
financial compensation, ranging from a single payment buyout to ongoing royalties
for the exploitation of the work. 8 In the case of a work-made-for-hire, the employer is
the author. 9 One of the consequences of creating a work for hire is that the employer
is the "author" with all of the rights of ownership, and the person who actually
created the work cannot recapture those rights with a valid termination. 10 Under the
1976 Copyright Act, an artist, or his or her heirs, may recapture his or her copyrights
thirty-five years after a contractual assignment." This right of "termination" causes
all rights in the work to revert to the artist or his or her heirs. 12 Record companies
prefer for sound recordings to be considered under the "work-made-for-hire" doctrine
because it prevents this right of termination and recapture. 1 3 Typical recording
contracts include a clause stating that the sound recordings are works made for
hire. 1 4 The purpose of the right of termination is to allow artists who cannot know
the future value of their work, to have greater bargaining power when that value is
4 United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Work Make for Hire: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 26
(2000) (statement of Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Rep., State of Mich.).
5 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
6Id.
7 Id. § 201(d).
8 United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire: Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 81
(2000) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the United States,
Library of Congress).
9 17 U.S.C. § 101.
A "work made for hire" is-(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of
his or her employment; or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as
a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work
shall be considered a work made for hire.
Id.
10 17 U.S.C. § 203(a).
"1Id.
12 Id. § 203(b).
13 Bill Holland, Works-For-Hire Provision Sparks Artist Furor, Demand For Change,
BILLBOARD, Jan. 22, 2000, at 122.
14 See, e.g., 25B MICHAEL R. COHEN, WEST'S LEGAL FORMS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 23:74,
5(a) (2009).
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revealed. 11 Artists' rights to terminate copyright assignments will begin to vest in
2013, thirty-five years after the first assignments were made under the 1976
Copyright Act. 16
To understand the current status of the work-made-for-hire doctrine and sound
recordings, one must first review the history of the doctrine and its relationship to
sound recordings.

A. History of Workfor Hire

1. 1909
Under the 1909 Copyright Act, sound recordings were not protected.17 Any
protection for sound recordings stemmed from state law. 18 The 1909 Act granted a
twenty-eight year term of copyright protection with a right to renew for an additional
twenty-eight year term. 19 This right to copyright protection and renewal was
intended to be exclusive to the author. 20 The 1909 Act codified common law that
indicated that the "employer" was the "author" of "works for hire". 21 The Act,
however, never defined a "work for hire".22 The Act also "did not expressly address
commissioned works." 23 Courts generally held that the hiring party owned the
copyright to the work. 24 From the onset, courts were forced to look to the intent of
Congress, and found that works prepared in the course of employment were classified
as "work for hire." 25 When determining rights in a case of an independent contractor,
the right to direct and supervise the work is a primary factor in determining
authorship, 26 while payment of cost, 27 inspiration for the work, 28 and the place of
creation 29 were also factors in the test.
15H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 124-25 (1976) (discussing § 203 "Termination of Transfers and
Licenses").
16 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3).
17Peters, supra note 8, at 78.
18Id.

19An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §§ 2324, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (1909).
20 Id.
21 Id. § 62.
22 See generally id (expressing tacitly that commissioned works are not included).
23 Peters, supra note 8, at 79.
24

Id.

25 See, e.g., Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1978) ("An employer is
entitled to the copyright only when the work was created by the employee within the scope of his
employment."); Scherr v. Universal Match Corp., 417 F.2d 497, 500 (2d Cir. 1969) ("'Authors and
proprietors' . . . are entitled to the copyright off a work of art. By § 26, 17 U.S.C. § 26, an 'author' is
further defined to include 'an employer in the case of works made for hire.' . . . [Section 26] merely
creates a rebuttable presumption of copyright in the employer, a presumption which can be
overcome by evidence of a contrary agreement between the parties.") (discussing what is now 17
U.S.C. § 101).
26 Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500-01; Donaldson Publ'g Co. v. Bregman, Vocco & Conn, Inc., 375 F.2d
639 (2d Cir. 1967); Murray, 566 F.2d at 1310; Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, 457 F.2d 1213, 1216 (2d
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2. 1976
The 1976 Copyright Act still did not define "work for hire," but did clarify that
works made within the scope of employment constitute a work for hire only with a
writing from both parties rebutting the presumption. 30 According to a statement of
Marybeth Peters, former Register of Copyrights, the revision of the Copyright Act
spanned many years, beginning with studies in 1955 from the Copyright Office. 31 In
1961, the Register of Copyrights recommended copyrights in sound recordings "be
protected against unauthorized duplication." 32 Sound recordings did not receive
federal copyright protection until 1971.33 The legislative history does not suggest
assigning a work made for hire status to sound recordings. 34 In the history, the
legislature points out:
The copyrightable elements in a sound recording will usually, though not
always, involve "authorship" both on the part of the performers whose
performance is captured and on the part of the record producer responsible
for setting up the recording session, capturing and electronically processing
the sounds, and compiling and editing them to make the final sound
recording. There may be cases where the record producer's contribution is
so minimal that the performance is the only copyrightable element in the
work, and there may be cases ... where only the record producer's
contribution is copyrightable. As in the case of motion pictures, the bill
does not fix the authorship, or the resulting ownership, of sound recordings,
but leaves these matters to the employment relationship and bargaining
among the interests involved. 35
When the 1976 Act was created, the work for hire doctrine created two distinct
definitions of works. 36 The first category applies to employees whose works were
prepared in the course and scope of their employment. 37 The second category
enumerates types of commissioned works, which include:
a contribution to a
collective work, a compilation, an instructional text, a test, answer material for a

Cir. 1972) (explaining that the right to direct and supervise the work of more than merely minor
importance).
27
Murray, 566 F.2d at 1310; Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500-01.
28Murray, 566 F.2d at 1310 (citations omitted).
29Scherr, 417 F.2d at 500-01.
30 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining work for hire to include a "work prepared by an employee
within the scope of his or her employment"); Id §20 1(b).
31Peters, supra note 8, at 78.
32 Id
33An Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101)
(amending the Copyright Act to provide protection for sound recordings).
34H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5 (1971); see Mary LaFrance, Authorship and Termination Rights
in Sound Recordings, 75 5. CAL. L. REV. 375, 385-89 (2002).
35 H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 5.
3617 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
37Id
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test, and an atlas. 38 Even in the case of the enumerated commissioned work
category, the parties must contractually agree that the person accepting the
commission consents in writing that the work will be considered a work for hire. 39
Therefore, the 1976 Copyright Act grants less protection for full-time creative
employees, and more protection to the individuals commissioned to create a work. 40
In the case of the second category of works-made-for-hire, "each category was
proposed by a particular copyright industry and every category was fully debated." 41
The rationale behind the exceptions was that the works done by freelance authors, at
the direction and risk of a publisher, should not be allowed to revert to the creator
when the commissioning party took all the risk.4 2 The other exceptions, which
include collective works and motion pictures, were created because the "resulting
work involved numerous authors and that permitting terminations of grants of rights
to such works would [result] in chaos." 43 It should be noted that sound recordings
"were never proffered as a category to be added to the list of commissioned works." 44

3. 1999
In 1999, two events occurred that shook the shaky legal precedent that
surrounded the legal definition and position of sound recordings. First, on March 5,
1999, Judge Greenway in Ballas v. Tedesco ruled that "sound recordings are not a
work-for-hire under the second part of the statute because they do not fit within any
of the nine enumerated categories." 45 Second, on November 29, 1999, the very last
day Congress was in session, a work-for-hire amendment was passed without debate,
which stated unequivocally that sound recordings were considered works-for-hire. 46
These two acts occurred less than six months apart, and showed the two sides of the
sound recording/work-for-hire coin.
The Ballas court looked to the nature of sound recordings and found:
[T]he sound recordings are not a work for hire under the second part of the
statute because they do not fit within any of the nine enumerated
categories, and because there was no signed written agreement between the
parties.... The definition does not provide that a sound recording standing
alone qualifies as work for hire under § 101(2).47

38Id.

§ 201(b).
40See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 590, 598-00 (1987).
41Peters, supra note 8, at 87.
42 Id.
43 Id.
39 17 U.S.C.

44

Id.

45 Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp. 2d 531, 541 (D.N.J. 1999).
46Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106113, § 1011, 113 Stat. 1501.
4'7Ballas, 41 F.Supp. 2d at 541.
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While this quote may not initially seem imposing, the implications are vast.
First, it gave (and continues to give) credence to the thought that artists may serve
valid terminations on record companies, beginning in 2003,48 and prove that the
record companies own terminable assignments in the sound recordings. 49 Second, it
allows artists to argue with precedent that sound recordings do not meet one of the
specifically enumerated categories of commissioned work under the work for hire
definition.5 0 Third, it aids the argument that the superficial language in a recording
contract and classifying the sound recording as a "work-made-for-hire" does not mean
that it fits the prescribed definition, and under the current definition, a mere
agreement to the contrary would not make it a work-made-for-hire under the color of
law. 51
Prior to November 26, 1999, sound recordings were not defined as a work-forhire, although record companies were pushing for that classification. 52 Record
companies started classifying sound recordings as "works-for-hire" in their contracts
with artists around 1970.53 However, the artists and the artists' community felt that
even though there was a clause in the contract that named the sound recordings a
work for hire, when the issue was contested, the courts would find that a sound
recording simply did not meet that definition. 54 Marybeth Peters summarized the
situation well in 2000:
My conversations with representatives of both performers and record
companies have confirmed my previous understanding: recording contracts
almost always contain provisions, which deem the sound recordings and any
contributions to them works made for hire. Copyright Office records show
that claims to copyright for sound recordings filed by record companies in
the 1970s named a record company as author by virtue of the work made of
hire doctrine and that today featured artists a s well as record companies
have filed claims to copyright listing themselves as authors by virtue of the
work made for hire doctrine.
However, the fact that work-for-hire
agreements and copyright registrations as works for hire have been made
does not lead to the legal conclusion that the sound recordings that are the
subjects of those agreements and registrations are indeed works made for
hire. If a specially ordered or commissioned work does not fall within one of
the categories set forth in the second part of the statutory definition, the
agreement of the parties cannot transform it into a work made for hire.
With respect to copyright registration, the Copyright Office does not inquire

4817 U.S.C. § 203(a)(4)(A) (2006) (stating valid termination notices may be served ten years
prior to the date of termination).
49 See Ballas, 41 F . Supp. 2d at 541.
51Id.
52Peters, supra note 8, at 90; see Holland, supra note 13, at 122.

53 Peters supra note 8, at 90.
54 Id.
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whether a sound recording meets all the requirements for a work made for
hire. 55
Under these circumstances, the Recording Industry Association of America
("RIAA") felt it needed to assure that sound recordings would be considered works
made for hire when the 2013 terminations started to vest. 56 Since notice of
terminations can occur up to ten years prior to the actual termination, time was of
the essence. 5 7 The amendment to the work-for-hire-doctrine was presented to
Congress as a technical amendment in an appendix to a bill that was more than 1000
pages.5 8 Overnight, the situation of artists and their sound recordings changed
dramatically. Outraged musicians and the Copyright Office quickly responded to the
change in copyright law. 59 Marybeth Peters approached Congress saying, "I do not
consider the recent amendment to have been a technical amendment. It changed
existing law by adding sound recordings as a category of commissioned works which
may be considered works for hire." 60 Simultaneously, the RIAA issued a statement
stating, "in everybody's view this was a technical issue." 61 Realizing that the
amendment may have been a proper subject for debate, Congress had a brief hearing
on the amendment in 2000.62

4. 2000
Because of the competing interests of the RIAA and sound recording artists,
Congress repealed the 1999 amendment. 63
The repeal, however, came with
additional language specifically instructing the courts to disregard both the 1999
legislation and the repeal when determining the merits of a work for hire claim:
In determining whether any work is eligible to be considered a work made
for hire under paragraph (2), neither the amendment contained in section
1011(d) of the Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform
Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law 106-113, nor the
deletion of the words added by that amendment

55 Id.

56Holland, supra note 13, at 122.
57 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a)-(b) (2006).
58 Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106113, § 1011, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999); Holland, supra note 13, at 122.
5 See Holland, supra note 13, at 5.
60Peters, supra note 8, at 91.
61 Bill Holland, Acts' Reps Decry C'right Clause, BILLBOARD, Jan. 15, 2000, at 75 (quoting
President/CEO of RIAA, Hilary Rosen).
62See Bill Holland, Subcommittee to Hear Witnesses, BILLBOARD, May 20, 2000, at 1 (stating
that the House will hear witnesses on May 25, 2000 regarding the "work made for hire" law).
63See Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379, § 2(a)
114 Stat. 1444; Kathryn Starshak, It's the End of the World as Musicians Know it, or Is it? Artists
Battle the Record Industry and Congress to Restore their Termination Rights in Sound Recordings,
51 DEPAUL L. REV. 71, 72 (2001) (discussing the amendments).
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(a) shall be considered or otherwise given legal significance, or
(b) shall be interpreted to indicate congressional approval or disapproval of,
or acquiescence in, any judicial determination,
by the courts or the Copyright Office. Paragraph(2) shall be interpreted as
if both section 2(a)(1) of the Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections
Act of 2000 and section 1011(d) of the Intellectual Property Communications
Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, as enacted by section 1000(a)(9) of Public Law
106-113, were never enacted, and without regard to any inaction or
awareness by the Congress at any time of any judicial determination.64
With this action, Congress embraced the confusion that surrounded the work
made for hire doctrine before the 1999 amendment, and increased the confusion by
refusing to take a stance on the issue either way. 65 The critical issue of the status of
the work made for hire definition in regard to sound recordings is now left squarely
in the corner of the federal courts.

5. New Contractual Language
After the defeat in federal court and in Congress, record companies again
modified their contracts to state that the parties agree that the master recordings are
to be considered specially commissioned works for inclusion in a compilation, thus
making the sound recordings a work for hire. 66 Again, the unequal bargaining power
dictates that the artists include the clause in the contract. Regardless of the
language, "the agreement of the parties cannot transform [the sound recordings] into
a work made for hire. 67

B. 2013 Terminations
As stated earlier, the initial ownership of copyrighted works vests with the
author of work. 68 Typically, in the case of sound recordings, the author then assigns
or licenses the copyrighted work to a record company who then distributes the
work. 69 In most works (works that are not works made for hire) the right to
terminate the assignment or license rests with the author or the author's heirs after
64 Work Made for Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000,

§ 2(a).

6 See Holland, supra note 13, at 121-22.
Contracts on file with author.
United States Copyright Office and Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire: Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 91
(2000) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Copyright Office of the United States,
Library of Congress).
68 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
69 Brian Day, In Defense of Copyright: Record Labels, Creativity, and the Future of Music, 21
SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 61, 67-68 (2011).
66

67
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a statutorily determined term of years. 70 In contrast, the authorship of a work for
hire does not reside in the creator in the work, but with the commissioner of the
work.7 1 Because the authorship does not reside with the creator of the work, the
work is not subject to terminations. 72
In 2013, artists will attempt to exercise their rights of termination in sound
recordings, while record companies will attempt to prove that the sound recordings
were commissioned under the work made for hire doctrine. Litigation between
record companies and artists is unavoidable, because the owner of the copyright will
be the owner of the income stream from sound recordings. Both sides are convinced
they are correct.

II. INAPPLICABILITY OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH

While the Copyright Act can be viewed from many angles, 73 traditionally the
Copyright Act has been viewed from two distinct points of view. The first views the
purpose of copyright as enhancing the creative environment, and tends to be an
artist-centered approach to copyright. 74 The second is an economic approach, which
focuses on the public's access to creative works. 75 Regarding the work-made-for-hire
doctrine, the economic approach is inapplicable, because the economic approach is
based on the concept that "Copyright ownership should go to the party in the better
position to exploit the value of the disputed work by bringing it to the public's

7017 U.S.C.
71 Id.
72 Id.

§ 203.

§ 201.
§ 203.

73See David Nimmer, Queen Anne in the Emperor's Shadow, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 919, 920 (2010)
(stating that Copyright has been viewed from economic, cultural, historical, philosophical, feminist,
and religious perspectives); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A search for
Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 589-600 (1985) (indicating that there are three
approaches that justify copyright protection:

exaltation of authorship, the constitutional approach,

and the economic approach).
74 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1151, 1177-92 (2007) (indicating social and cultural interaction produce art and culture); Dreyfuss,
supra note 40, at 590; David Ladd, To Cope with the World Upheaval in Copyright, 19 COPYRIGHT
289 (1983).
7 See, e.g., Alina Ng, When Users Are Authors: Authorship in the Age of Digital Media, 12
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 853, 857 (2010) (noting that traditionally, the economic aspect of copyright
is seen to promote authors to create); Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of
Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Bestsellers,
92 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1031-34 (2008) (approaching Copyright Law from the economic "incentive to

create" theory); Matthew J. Sag, Beyond Abstraction: The Law and Economics of Copyright Scope
and Doctrinal Efficiency, 81 TUL. L. REV. 187, 192-97 (2006) (stating there is a functional approach
to the economic incentives of copyright); I.T. Hardy, An Economic Understandingof Copyright Law's
Work-Made-for-Hire Doctrine, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS, 181, 189 (1988); Ralph S. Brown,
Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L. REV. 579, 607

(1985) (noting that the economic approach "admires authorship and creativity-but as public good
which should not be constrained by ownership, except where a right to seek a reward is a necessary
stimulus to authorship"); Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright

in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 (1970).
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attention."76 This should not occur with sound recordings, because record companies
will always be in a greater position to exploit the work, but did not have as great of a
role in the creation of the work.77
The tension between the two philosophies described above has existed since the
creation of the 1909 Copyright Act. Under the 1909 Copyright Act, disputes over
ownership of a work in a work for hire situation were almost always settled in favor
of the employer.7 Several scholars have interpreted this to mean that disputes over
copyright ownership arising under the 1909 Act were settled in favor of the party
with the greater resources to exploit or market the work.79
The 1976 Copyright Act did not resolve the tension between the competing
philosophies and the competing interests.80 In 1988, although Professor I.T. Hardy of
Marshall-Wythe School of Law wrote an analysis that favors an economic approach,
he predicted that:
[A] changing market for copyrightable works will eventually force Congress
more affirmatively to favor creators with a narrowed work-for-hire doctrine.
Courts, however, will continue to favor the better exploiter to the extent
they and do so because in individual cases, the work already exists and the
need is for efficient exploitation through marketing and distribution.8
Twenty-five years later, Congress has still not created a more narrow approach
to the work for hire doctrine. 82 In regard to sound recordings, Congress has explicitly
declined to take a stance on the work for hire doctrine. 83 However, the courts should
not adopt the economic approach to the work for hire doctrine in sound recordings,
because it is socially unfair and against public policy.

A. Artists Have Non-Economic Interests That Should Be Protected
According to Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, creative employees have three primary
non-pecuniary interests, which make the economic approach incomplete. 84 The first
interest is a possessory interest in their work, which means that the work must fulfill
their creative vision. 85 The second interest is an interest in the integrity of their
work. 86 Dreyfuss states that this interest is endangered with commercial influence. 8 7
76 Hardy, supra note 75, at 181.
77See Peters, supra note 8, at 124.
78 Id.
7 Hardy, supra note 75, at 181; Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 595 ("The [1909] Act ... did not
define the term 'works made for hire.' To fill this omission, courts looks to the policies underlying
copyright and the notion of 'deemed authorship.' Starting with the presumption that works
prepared in the course of employment were works for hire. .. )
80 Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 598; Hardy, supra note 72, at 183-85.
s' Hardy, supra note 75, at 227.
8217 U.S.C. § 201 (2006).
83 See H.R. Conf. Rep. 106-464, at 106 (1999) (Conf. Rep.).
84 Dreyfuss, supra note 40, at 605-14.
85 Id. at 605.
868
Id.
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The third interest deals with the reputation of the author, which manifests in
concern over how the work is presented.88 Dreyfuss notes that society recognizes
that high quality work enriches cultural heritage. 89 She also notes that "[artists]
purposefully design works that are disturbing to society and difficult to understand"
and this in turn creates an indifference to public demand. 90 Dreyfuss comes to the
conclusion that the work for hire definition and statute should be construed and
designed in a way to encourage creative efforts. 91

B. The Record Company Will Always Have a Greater Ability To Exploit the Work, but
Does Not Have an Ability To Create the Work
Sound recording artists usually assign their copyrights in sound recordings to
record companies to enjoy the effect of the record companies' ability to exploit their
works directly to radio stations and market the artist to a fan base. 92 Basically, a
record company is a bank with the ability to market and distribute music to the
public. 93 Artists contract with record companies to gain their marketing expertise. 94
Record companies still have the ability to turn artists into stars and songs into hits. 95
The typical recording artist is not an employee of the record company. 96 A
typical recording contract will contain a clause that specifically states that the artist
is not an employee and that the artist and the label are not partners. 97 This clause is
designed to limit the label's liability for the bad behavior of the artist and the
lawsuits that generally follow acts on tour. 98
While do-it-yourself ("DJY") is the new model for many independent artists, it is
the model for those artists because their prospects for signing with a record label are
limited, if they exist at all. 99 The majority of DIY independent artists would prefer to
be signed to a label, if a label would have them. 100 For that reason, the labels have
the upper hand in the negotiations and can demand that certain clauses are non87Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. ("High-quality work enriches the cultural heritage; thus it is important to allow and
encourage someone with expertise, and an understanding of the vision underlying the work, to
protect its integrity.").
90Id. at 609.
91Id. at 638-43.

92Day, supra note 69, at 67-68.
93 See, e.g., Day, supra note 69, at 88, 103; Peters, supra note 8, at 124.
94 Day, supra note 69, at 88.
95 Id.
96See M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SYNDEY SHEMEL, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC:
THE
DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL ISSUES OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 187 (Robert

Nirkind et al. eds., 10th ed. 2007).

97

See, e.g., 4 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDEAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, PUBL. &

THE ARTS § 9:39, T 27 (3d ed. 2011).
98 Id.

9 See Heather D. Rafter et al., Streaming Into the Future: Music and Video on The Internet, in
19TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW, at 605, 611-12 (Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and
Literary Prop. Course Handbook Ser. No. GO-004D, 1999), available at WL, 547 PLI/Pat 605.
100 Id.
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negotiable, like the work for hire clause so that it remains in the contract despite any
objections from the artist's lawyer. 101 The standardization of "360 deals," 102 where
the record company now takes a percentage of the publishing, touring, and
merchandise revenue of the artist, is further evidence of the bargaining power the
labels wield. 1 03 The record labels demand the additional revenue streams because
the business has evolved from an album sales model where physical product was sold
at record stores, to a single sales model where single songs are sold over the
internet. 1 04 DIY independent artists can retain most of their rights and reach an
audience by marketing themselves on the internet, but, so far, label artists have
continued to be more successful. 105
To stay in business, the record labels have demanded that new artists sign 360
deals. 1 06 And while it is possible for an artist to record music and distribute it over
the internet, most artists are anxious for a deal with a record label. 107 Because
artists signed to record labels are perceived to be successful or have the ability to be
successful, the artists have reluctantly agreed to share all of their income with the
label in order to have access to the label's distribution and marketing.1 08 So while it
is possible for the artist to record and distribute his or her music without a label, it is
generally perceived as preferable for an artist to sign with a label.109 In the age of
DIY, artists do not have to have a label, but labels cannot exist without artists.
Despite that reality, the labels have maintained their bargaining power over most
artists. 110

If courts continue to use an economic approach when determining whether or
not a work qualifies as a work for hire, the artist will always lose. 111 There are
scholars who argue that the economic approach is the only way to ensure distribution
to the public; 1 1 2 however, in reality, reliance on this theory ensures that the record

101See Ryan Ashley Rafoth, Note, Limitations of the 1999 Work-For-Hire Amendment: Courts

Should Not Consider Sound Recordings to be Works-For-Hire When Artists' Terminations Rights
Begin Vesting in Year 2013, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1022-23 (2000); see, e.g., COHEN, supra note 14,
§ 23:74, 5(a).
102Day, supra note 69, at 72-73.

103Id.; Jeff Carter, Comment, Strictly Business: A Historical Narrative and Commentary on
Rock and Roll Business Practices, 78 TENN. L. REV. 213, 248 (2010) (discussing how 360 deals
encompass what used to be stand alone contracts).
104William Henslee, Marybeth Peters Is Almost Right: An Alternative to Her Proposals to
Reform the Compulsory License Scheme for Music, 48 WASHBURN L. J. 107 (2008); Day, supra note
69, at 78-84.
105Id. at 71-78.
106Id. at 72-76 (discussing the rise of 360 deals after record companies had nearly a decade of

declining revenue).
107 Id. at 77-78.
108 Id. at 74-76.
109 Id. at 7778.
110See Rafter, supra note 99, at 611-12.
11See Hardy, supra note 75, at 227.
112 See, e.g., Assaf Jacob, Tort Made for Hire-ReconsideringThe CCNV Case, 11 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 96 (2009) (arguing to step away from the work for hire test delineated in CCNV and for the
agency test to include "factors such as the parties' relative incentive to create new works, public
accessibility, transaction costs, and the relative ability and motivation to disseminate works to the
public."); Hardy, supra note 75, at 183-85.
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company will own the work as a work made for hire. 113 In addition, it ensures that
the individual or individuals responsible for creating the work never reap the
rewards of their creative labor. While the economic test may be appropriate in other
areas delineated as works made for hire, it is not appropriate for sound recordings.
Intellectual property is difficult to value before it is released on the market. 114
Musicians, and other creative artists, have unequal bargaining power when a deal is
made because the creators of the work lack the tools needed to exploit their work. 115
The right of termination was created by Congress for the purpose of "safeguarding
authors against unremunerative transfers ... because of the unequal bargaining
position of the authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a
work's [prior] value until it has been exploited." 11 6 The premise behind the right of
termination is to give artists a second-bite at the apple after their work has
matured. 117 Because artists do not have equal bargaining power on the front end of a
record deal negotiation, it seems contrary to public policy and the purpose behind the
Copyright Act to allow for the economic test to be used in the work for hire analysis
when dealing with sound recordings.

III. ARTISTS' SOUND RECORDINGS ARE NOT WORKS FOR HIRE
In 1989, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to construe the definition of
"work made for hire" in the case, Community For Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV") v.
Reid. 118 Justice Marshall opened the opinion of the Court with "To resolve this
dispute, we must construe the 'work made for hire' provisions of the Copyright Act of
1976 ... and in particular, the provision in § 101, which defines as a 'work made for
hire' a 'work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment'." 119
In a unanimous opinion, the Court found the pertinent legal issues were the
definitions of "employee" and "scope of employment." 1 20 The Court noted that neither
"employee" nor "scope of employment" was defined in the Copyright Act and turned
to legislative history to determine the intent of Congress. 1 21 The Court stated,
In past cases of statutory interpretation, when we have concluded that
Congress intended terms such as "employee,""employer," and "scope of
employment" to be understood in light of agency law, we have relied on the

113See Hardy, supra note 75, at 227.
114 Ian McClure, Termination Rights: A Second Bite at the Apple, 56 FED. LAW. 16, 16 (Jan.
2009).
115Id.

116H.R. REP. No. 94-1476 (1976); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 9.02 (2006) ("[U]nlike real property and other forms of personal property, [it] is by
its very nature incapable of accurate monetary evaluation prior to its exploitation.").
117 NIMMER, supra note 116, § 9.02.
118 490 U.S. 730, 736 (1989).
119 Id. at 732.
120Id. at 740.
121 Id .
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general common law of agency, rather than on the law of any particular
State, to give meaning to these terms. 1 22
The common law of agency, which the Supreme Court relied upon, enumerates a
non-exclusive list of factors to determine whether or not one is an employee or
independent contractor:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general
common law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the
matter and means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other
factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants' whether the work is part
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the
hired party. 123
In the case of sound recordings, the agency test laid out in CCNV leads to a
conclusion that artists are not employees of the record company and the work for hire
doctrine does not apply to sound recordings. 1 24 While none of the factors are
dispositive, a review of the major criteria reveals that the relationship between a
record company and an artist is not the type of relationship anticipated by Congress
under the current work for hire doctrine.

122 Id.

Id. at 751 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958)).
Id. at 752. Other scholars and commentators have come to the same conclusion. See
generally, e.g., Daniel Gould, Comment, Times Up: Copyright Termination, Work-For-Hire and the
Recording Industry, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91 (2007); Mark H. Jaffe, Comment, Defusing The Time
Bomb once Again-Determining Authorship in a Sound Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A.
139 (2006); John P. Strohm, Comment, Writings in the Margin (of Error): The Authorship Status of
Sound Recordings Under United States Copyright Law, 34 CUMB. L. REV. 156 (2003); LaFrance,
supra note 34, at 385-89; Randy S. Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in
Sound Recordings: Is There a Leak in the Record Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
211, 218-19 (1993). But see, Day, supra note 69, at 71 ("[I]t is simply not clear whether Congress
intended to give featured vocalists the right to terminate record label ownership of sound recordings.
Courts will likely take part in resolving this issue when artists and musicians begin to challenge the
work made for hire provisions of their recording agreements in 2013. .. ); Abbott Marie Jones, Get
Ready Cause Here They Come: A Look at Problems on the Horizon for Authorship and Termination
Rights in Sound Recordings, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 127 (2008) (indicating that the
position of sound recordings as works made for hire is unclear and calling for Congress to give
indication of legislative intent).
123
124
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A. Right to Control
The right to control the budget and the ultimate decision on the songs to be
released lies with the record company. 1 25 The right to control the creative process
belongs to the artist. 126
The record company typically provides a lump sum budget for the artist to
record an album. 1 27 The recording process begins with the artist preparing a detailed
budget for each song to be recorded. 1 28 Costs included in a typical song budget
include the cost of studio time, the producer's fee, the engineer's fee, the fees for
studio musicians, mastering costs, food costs, transportation costs, and miscellaneous
costs. 129 After the budget is submitted, the record label has the right to approve or
disapprove of the song budget. 1 30 In addition, the label has the right to have a
representative present during the recording process. 1 31 Ultimately, the label has the
right to reject the album, or demand additional songs, if they believe the album is not
commercially marketable. 1 32
The artist writes the songs, chooses the producer(s) (subject to the approval of
the label), chooses the musicians, prepares the arrangement, books the studio,
records the master, and participates in the mixing of the song. 1 33 The recording is
done at the convenience of the recording studio, the musicians, and the producer. 1 34
Many recording sessions begin around sunset and end around sunrise. 1 35 The hours
are not prescribed by the record company or by a set schedule. 1 36 The label does not
typically dictate when or where the recording takes place, how long it takes to record
each song, or who performs on the song. 137
The artist is responsible for paying the producer, the studio, the engineer, the
arranger, paying the musicians, and for the mastering from the budget approved by
the label. 1 38 The artist acts as an independent contractor, as specified in the
contract. 139

125MICHAEL A. ACZON, THE PROFESSION MUSICIAN'S LEGAL COMPANION 56 (2005).

126E.g., Sample Business Contracts:
Exclusive Recording Contract, ONECLE § 3.1,
http://contracts.onecle.com/blue-moon/no-soap-radio.svc. 1999.shtml (last visited June 9, 2011).
127Day, supra note 69, at 75.
128E.g., Exclusive Recording Contract, supra note 126, §§ 3.2, 5.1, 6.02.
129See Aczon, supra note 125, at 60-61.
130See id. at 56.
131 E.g.,

Exclusive Recording Contract, supra note 126, § 3.1.
132See Aczon, supra note 125, at 56.
133See id.
134See, e.g., Ken Nelson, Recording Coldplay's Parachutes, SOUND ON SOUND (Oct. 2000),

http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/oct00/articles/ken.htm.
Parachutes discusses the process of recording the album.

The engineer behind Coldplay's album

135See, e.g., id.
136See, e.g., id.
137See, e.g., id.; Day, supra note 69, at 74.
138 DONALD PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 81 (7th ed. 2009).
139See Comm. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 750-51 (1989).
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B. Skill Required
The artist is signed to the record label because the label believes the artist has
the unique skill to make hit records. The label's skill rests with its ability to spot
talent, nurture the artist through the recording process, market the artist and the
artist's music, and distribute the music. 1 40 The creative talent resides solely with the
artist. While every artist is not a songwriter or musician, the artist is the voice that
the public remembers. 1 41 The artist's voice and delivery make songs hits. 142

C. Relationship Between the Parties
A typical recording contract between a label and an artist states that the artist
is not an employee of the label and the artist is an independent contractor. 143 When
the contract covers the ownership of the masters, it states that the label owns the
masters as a work for hire, but in the event that the masters are determined not to
be works for hire, the artist agrees to assign the copyrights to the label, and the
artist grants the label a power of attorney to transfer the copyrights in the masters
from the artist to the label in case the artist refuses to sign the transfer. 144
The label typically assigns an A&R executive to serve as the liaison between the
label and the artist. 1 45 The A&R representative is usually the label executive who
originally discovered that artist and presented the artist to the label executives who
decide whether to sign the artist and how much to spend on developing the artist. 146
The A&R person provides some creative input on behalf of the label concerning song
selection, producers, studios, and collaborators. 1 47 While the label executives work
closely with the artist, they do not control the artist by dictating a recording
schedule, a touring schedule, or songwriting. 148

140 PATRIK WIKSTROM, THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 55-56 (2009).

141See SHERRI BURR & WILLIAM HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS OF
FILM, TELEVISION, AND MUSIC 691 (2004); GEORGE HOWARD, GETTING SIGNED! 15-18 (2004).
142 See, e.g., Joan McGurk, Dolly Wasn't Parton with Hit Song, BELFAST TELEGRAPH (Mar. 25,

2007),
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/sunday-life/news/dolly-wasnt-parton-with-hit-song13903099.html. I Will Always Love You was written by Dolly Parton in 1973. She first released the
song as a single in 1974. Whitney Houston's 1992 version of the song is one of the fewer than thirty
all-time singles to have sold ten million (or more) copies worldwide. HOWARD, supra note 141, at 1518.
143 KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 96, at 187.
144 Id. at 27.
145 RICHARD SCHULENBERG, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSIC INDUSTRY 25 (2005).
146Id. at 21.
147
148

Id. atl 21-2.
See id. at 25.
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D. Payment Between The Record Company And The Artist
Artists' typically receive a signing advance and a record budget from the label. 149
All of the money advanced by the label is recoupable from the money the label earns
from record sales. 150 If the album recoups its budget, the artist receives royalties
from record sales. 15 1 If the album does not recoup its budget, the unrecouped amount
is typically cross-collateralized with the subsequent albums' budgets and other
income received by the label. 1 52 If the artist does not sell enough units to recoup the
advances and budgets, the artist will not receive any additional money from the
label. 1 53 In addition to songwriting income, artists' typically support themselves by
touring and selling merchandise. 1 54 Recording artists are not salaried employees
with taxes withheld by the label. The label issues 1099 forms, not W-2s.

IV. APPROACH TO RECLAIM ARTISTs' RIGHTS DURING 2013

Because Congress and the Copyright Office have not taken a stance on the
construction of the work for hire statute regarding sound recordings, federal courts
will make this decision if pushed to litigation by contentious parties. 155 Record
companies will point to the work for hire clause that comes standard with recording
contracts. 1 56 The typical clause contains language similar to: "[the sound recordings]
shall be considered works 'made for hire' for [the record company] within the
meaning of the United States Copyright Act." 15 7 However, regardless of the language
of the contract, only works that fit under the definition set out in § 101 can be
considered works made for hire. 15 8 Federal Courts are in a position to determine that
the standard work for hire clause is unenforceable.
A clear indication of legislative intent and deliberate policy-making by Congress
would be the ideal circumstance; however, if Congress continues to remain silent on
the issue, the federal courts, circuits, and potentially the Supreme Court will have to
determine these issues as they become a pressing issue in the coming years. In these
decisions, federal courts will have to consider the reverberating effects the decision
will have on the recording industry.
Record companies will most likely have high-priced, specialized attorneys, with
the RIAA behind them. The record companies will most likely point out that both
parties (the recording artist/author and the record company) expect the record
149See Day, supra note 69, at 74.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152See, e.g., SCHULENBERG, supra note 145, at 102-03 (2005).
153 PASSMAN, supra note 138, at 79-80.
154See, e.g., GEOFFREY HULL, THOMAS HUTCHINSON & RICHARD STRASSER, THE MUSIC
BUSINESS AND RECORDING INDUSTRY 161 (3d ed. 2011) (discussing how artists make money at

shows and even sell albums at concerts to roughly ten percent of concertgoers).
155Work Made For Hire and Copyright Corrections Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-379, § 2(a) 114
Stat. 1444.
156See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 14, § 23:74.
157 Id.
158

17 U.S.C.

§ 101 (2006).
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company to exploit the copyrighted work for the duration of the copyright.
Otherwise, no assignment would have initially been granted to the recording
company. Also, the contract that deems all sound recordings as work for hire is
standard and typical industry practice. The most obvious and pressing concern for
the record companies will be the loss of expected income, which is assured to forever
damage an already struggling industry as they battle music piracy and a continually
changing business model.
Recording artists should argue that the termination right is inalienable. As
Congress stated in 1976, "Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding
any agreement to the contrary.
."159
The Copyright Act strongly supports a
conclusion that the contractual work for hire clause is unenforceable because:
(1) sound recordings do not fit into one of the nine enumerated categories of work for
hire; and (2) the work for hire clause should be unenforceable due to unequal
bargaining power of the record company and recording artist. Recording artists may
also claim the work for hire clause is unenforceable due to the unconscionability of
the clause. 1 60 The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") states that a court may limit
or disregard the application of any unconscionable term to "avoid any unconscionable
result". 1 6 1 This could be an alternate argument to the unalienable termination right.
As Mary LaFrance points out, however, even if sound recording are found not to
fall under the work made for hire statute, there may still be a problem with
terminations. 162 Any uncertainty about the authorship of a work may make it
difficult to terminate the grant. 1 63 Thus, if the record companies claim multiple
authors contributed to the work, then a majority of authors must join the decision to
terminate. 1 64 La France points to the sections dealing with derivative works and
collective works as potential arguments the record company may attempt to use. 1 65
A record album may be considered a derivative work if the courts consider the sound
recording to be a work based on underlying recording contributions of individual
performers and producers. 1 66 While this argument is unlikely to be persuasive, it
will entangle sound recording terminations in fact-intensive inquiries that will vary
on a case-by-case basis and be unlikely to lead to a bright line rule about the status of
sound recordings.

159 Id. § 304(c)(5). See also Peter S. Menella & David Nimmer, Judicial Resistance to Copyright
Law's Inalienable Right to Terminate Transfers, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 227 (2010) (discussing the
clearly expressed intent of Congress to allow termination rights to authors and the recent judicial
missteps that frustrated that intent); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism
in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 627-28 (2010) (indicating authors lose autonomy when their
termination rights can be contracted away or when record companies achieve "unified ownership"
through a work for hire clause).
160See Burrows, supra note 2, at 127.
161U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004).
162LaFrance, supra note 34, at 392-418.
163Id. at 393-94.
164 Id
165Id. at 394.

166Id.
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V. CONCLUSION

As 2013 approaches, the conflict between recording artists and record companies
will most likely result in litigation over the status of the copyrighted works. While
the most efficient and frugal solution would be legislative action, the most probable
outcome is expensive, fact-intensive litigation. Congress and the Supreme Court
have emphasized the value of predictability in copyright ownership. 167 In this
situation, Congress has fallen short of that goal. Sound Recordings do not fit the
definition of work made for hire under the 1976 Copyright Act. 168 While analyzing
the 2013 terminations, courts should not overlook the congressional intent of creating
an inalienable termination right for authors.

167See Comm. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749-50 (1989) (stating
Congress' intent in revising the 1976 Copyright Act was "enhancing predictability and certainty of
copyright ownership").
168See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).

